Disadvantages of Presidential Systems
Critics generally claim three basic disadvantages for presidential systems:
Tendency towards authoritarianism — some political scientists say that presidentialism is not constitutionally stable. According to some political scientists, such as Fred Riggs, presidentialism has fallen into authoritarianism in every country it has been attempted.
Separation of powers — a presidential system establishes the presidency and the legislature as two parallel structures. Critics argue that this creates undesirable gridlock, and that it reduces accountability by allowing the president and the legislature to shift blame to each other.
Impediments to leadership change — it is claimed that the difficulty in removing an unsuitable president from office before his or her term has expired represents a significant problem.
[edit] Tendency towards authoritarianism
Winning the presidency is a winner-take-all, zero-sum prize. A prime minister who does not enjoy a majority in the legislature will have to either form a coalition or, if he is able to lead a minority government, govern in a manner acceptable to at least some of the opposition parties. Even if the prime minister leads a majority government, he must still govern within (perhaps unwritten) constraints as determined by the members of his party - a premier in this situation is often at greater risk of losing his party leadership than his party is at risk of losing the next election. On the other hand, once elected president can not only marginalize the influence of other parties, but can exclude rival factions in his own party as well, or even leave the party whose ticket he was elected under. The president can thus rule without any allies for the duration of one or possibly consecutive terms, a worrisome situation for many interest groups. Juan Linz argues that the danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate. . . losers must wait four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization.
Some political scientists go further, and argue that presidential systems have difficulty sustaining democratic practices, noting that presidentialism has slipped into authoritarianism in many of the countries in which it has been implemented. Seymour Martin Lipset and others are careful to point out that this has taken place in political cultures unconducive to democracy, and that militaries have tended to play a prominent role in most of these countries. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the presidential system may have played a role in some situations.
In a presidential system, the legislature and the president have equally valid mandates from the public. There is often no way to reconcile conflict between the branches of government. When president and legislature are at loggerheads and government is not working effectively, there is a powerful incentive to employ extra-constitutional maneuvres to break the deadlock.
[edit] Separation of powers
Presidential systems are said by critics not to offer voters the kind of accountability seen in parliamentary systems. It is easy for either the president or Congress to escape blame by blaming the other. Describing the United States, former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon said "the president blames Congress, the Congress blames the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington." (Checks and Balances, 10).
In Congressional Government, Woodrow Wilson asked,
. . . how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping? . . . Power and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good government. . . . It is, therefore, manifestly a radical defect in our federal system that it parcels out power and confuses responsibility as it does. The main purpose of the Convention of 1787 seems to have been to accomplish this grievous mistake. The `literary theory' of checks and balances is simply a consistent account of what our constititution makers tried to do; and those checks and balances have proved mischievous just to the extent which they have succeeded in establishing themselves . . . [the Framers] would be the first to admit that the only fruit of dividing power had been to make it irresponsible.(Congressional Government, 186-7)
Consider the example of the increase in the federal debt of the United States that occurred during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Arguably, the deficits were the product of a bargain between President Reagan and Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O'Neill: O'Neill agreed not to oppose Reagan's tax cuts if Reagan would sign the Democrats' budget. Each side could claim to be displeased with the debt, plausibly blame the other side for the deficit, and still tout its own success.
[edit] Impediments to leadership change
Another alleged problem of presidentialism is that it is often difficult to remove a president from office early. Even if a president is "proved to be inefficient, even if he becomes unpopular, even if his policy is unacceptable to the majority of his countrymen, he and his methods must be endured till the moment comes for a new election." (Balfour, intro to the English Constitution). Consider John Tyler, who only became president because William Henry Harrison had died after thirty days. Tyler refused to sign Whig legislation, was loathed by his nominal party, but remained firmly in control of the executive branch. Since there is no legal way to remove an unpopular president, many presidential countries have experienced military coups to remove a leader who is said to have lost his mandate, as in Salvador Allende.
In parliamentary systems, unpopular leaders such as Tyler and Allende can be quickly removed by a vote of no confidence, a procedure which is reckoned to be a "pressure release valve" for political tension. Votes of no confidence are easier to achieve in minority government situations, but even if the unpopular leader heads a majority government, nonetheless he is often in a far less secure position than a president. Removing a president through impeachment is a process mandated by the constitution and is usually made into a very difficult process, by comparison the process of removing a party leader is governed by the (often much less formal) rules of the party in question. Nearly all parties (including governing parties) have a relatively simple and straightforward process for removing their leaders. If a premier sustains a serious enough blow to his populatiry and refuses to resign on his own, then other prominent party members will likely initiate a leadership challenge in hopes of mitigating damage to the party. More often than not, a premier facing a serious challenge will resign before he or she is formally removed - Margaret Thatcher's relinquishing of her premiership being a prominent, recent example.
In The English Constitution, Walter Bagehot criticized presidentialism because it does not allow a transfer in power in the event of an emergency.
Under a cabinet constitution at a sudden emergency the people can choose a ruler for the occasion. It is quite possible and even likely that he would not be ruler before the occasion. The great qualities, the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager nature fit for a great crisis are not required - are impediments- in common times. A Lord Liverpool is better in everyday politics than a Chatham- a Louis Philippe far better than a Napoleon. By the structure of the world we want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to change the helmsman - to replace the pilot of the calm by the pilot of the storm.
But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind. The American government calls itself a government of the supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have got a congress elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed installments, which cannot be accelerated or retarded - you have a president chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: . . there is no elastic element. . . you have bespoken your government in advance, and whether it is what you want or not, by law you must keep it . . . (The English Constitution, the Cabinet.)
Finally, many have criticized presidential systems for their alleged slowness in responding to their citizens' needs. Often, the checks and balances make action extremely difficult. Walter Bagehot said of the American system "the executive is crippled by not getting the law it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive becomes unfit for its name, since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking decisions of others [and not itself] will suffer the effects." (ibid.)
[edit] Differences from a cabinet system
A number of key theoretical differences exist between a presidential and a cabinet system:
In a presidential system, the central principle is that the legislative and executive branches of government should be separate. This leads to the separate election of president, who is elected to office for a fixed term, and only removable for gross misdemeanor by impeachment and dismissal. In addition he or she does not need to choose cabinet members commanding the support of the legislature. By contrast, in parliamentarism, the executive branch is led by a council of ministers, headed by a Prime Minister, who are directly accountable to the legislature and often have their background in the legislature (regardless of whether it is called a "parliament", a "diet", a "chamber").
As with the president's set term of office, the legislature also exists for a set term of office and cannot be dissolved ahead of schedule. By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the legislature can typically be dissolved at any stage during its life by the head of state, usually on the advice of either Prime Minister alone, by the Prime Minister and cabinet, or by the cabinet.
In a presidential system, the president usually has special privileges in the enactment of legislation, namely the possession of a power of veto over legislation of bills, in some cases subject to the power of the legislature by weighed majority to override the veto. However, it is extremely rare for the president to have the power to directly propose laws, or cast a vote on legislation. The legislature and the president are thus expected to serve as checks and balances on each other's powers.
Presidential system presidents may also be given a great deal of constitutional authority in the exercise of the office of Commander in Chief, a constitutional title given to most presidents. In addition, the presidential power to receive ambassadors as head of state is usually interpreted as giving the president broad powers to conduct foreign policy. Though semi-presidential systems may reduce a president's power over day to day government affairs, semi-presidential systems commonly give the president power over foreign policy.
Presidential systems also have fewer ideological parties than parliamentary systems[citation needed]. Sometimes in the United States, the policies preferred by the two parties have been very similar (but see also polarization). In the 1960s, during the leadership of Lyndon Johnson, the Senate Democrats included the right-most members of the chamber - Harry Byrd and Strom Thurmond, and the left-most members - Paul Douglas and Herbert Lehman. This pattern prevails in Latin American presidential democracies and the Philippines as well.
Taken from Wikipedia
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Government Structure
Government Structure [and Electoral Systems ]
Dr Benjamin Reilly, Australian National University, Canberra, AUSTRALIA
This short paper sets out options for structuring a system of government and choosing an electoral system in Afghanistan. It focuses on the comparative experience of other transitional democracies in choosing amongst and between the various options available in these areas. In particular, it examines the choices made by other countries which have recently emerged from a period of protracted conflict.
1. Government Structure: Presidential, Parliamentary, or Semi-Presidential?
There are essentially three options for constituting a representative system of government: one based on a parliamentary system, one based on a presidential system, and one based on some mixture of the two (usually called semi-presidentialism).
Parliamentary systems are characterized by the legislature being the principal arena for both lawmaking and (via majority decisions) for executive power. Presidential systems are characterized by the separation of the executive and legislative branches, with executive authority residing outside the legislature, with the president and his or her cabinet. The simplest definition of the differences between the two approaches can thus be summed up by the degree of relative independence of the executive. Presidential systems are characterized by executive independence, whereas parliamentary systems are characterized the mutual dependence and intertwining of both legislative and executive capacities.
In post-conflict societies, the key distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism focuses on the range of parties and opinions that can be represented in the executive under a parliamentary system, in contrast to the unavoidably singular nature of authority represented by the office of the president. However, as with many institutional choices, the debate over the merits of parliamentary versus presidential government is not so much a question of which is best, but rather of the most appropriate choice for a given society, considering its particular social structure, political culture and history.
Parliamentary systems
In general, the majority of the world's "established" democracies use parliamentary systems.
The advantages of parliamentary systems include:
Ability to facilitate the inclusion of all groups within the legislature and the executive. Because cabinets in parliamentary systems are usually drawn from members of the elected legislature, parliamentary government enables the inclusion of all political elements represented in the legislature (including minorities) in the executive. Cabinets comprising a coalition of several
different parties are a typical feature of many well-established parliamentary democracies. In societies deeply divided by ethnic or other cleavages, this principle of inclusion can be vital.
Flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Because governments in most parliamentary systems can change on the floor of the legislature without recourse to a general election, advocates of parliamentarism point to its flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing circumstances as a strong benefit. A discredited government can be dismissed from office by the parliament itself, in contrast to the fixed terms common to presidential systems.
"Checks and balances". By making the executive dependent, at least in theory, upon the confidence of the legislature, parliamentary systems are said to foster greater accountability on the part of the government of the day towards the people's representatives. Proponents argue that this means that there is not only greater public control over the policy-making process, but also greater transparency in the way decisions are made.
The major disadvantages of parliamentary systems include:
Tendency towards ponderous or immobile decision-making. The inclusiveness that typifies coalition governments can easily turn into executive deadlocks caused by the inability of the various parties to agree upon key issues. This was typified by the "immobilism" that affected Fourth Republic France and that was partly responsible for General de Gaulle's assumption of presidential power. Decision-making deadlock was in part responsible for the breakdown of power sharing under Cyprus's 1960 constitution.
Lack of accountability and discipline. Critics also argue that parliamentary systems are inherently less accountable than presidential ones, as responsibility for decisions is taken by the collective cabinet rather than a single figure. This is especially problematic when diverse coalitions form the executive, as it can be difficult for electors to establish who is responsible for a particular decision and make a retrospective judgement as to the performance of the government.
Propensity towards weak or fragmented government. Some parliamentary systems are typified by shifting coalitions of many different political parties, rather than by a strong and disciplined party system. Under such circumstances, executive government is often weak and unstable, leading to a lack of continuity and direction in public policy.
Presidential systems
Presidentialism has been a popular choice amongst many new democracies in the last decade, especially in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. While the influence of the United States, the world's best known presidential system, is probably partly responsible for this trend, recent experience has also highlighted a number of advantages of presidentialism:
A directly elected president is identifiable and accountable to voters to a high degree. The office of the president can be held directly accountable for decisions taken because, in contrast to parliamentary systems, the chief executive is directly chosen by popular vote. It is thus easier for the electorate to reward or retrospectively punish a president (by voting him or her out of office) than is the case with parliamentary systems.
Ability of a president to act as a unifying national figure, standing above the fray of sectarian disputes. A president enjoying broad public support can represent the nation to itself, becoming a unifying symbol between rival political groupings. To play this role, however, it is important that the rules used to elect the president are tailored so as to achieve this type of broad support (see the following section on "Electoral Systems" for details).
Higher degree of choice. The fact that presidential systems typically give voters a dual choice - one vote for the president and one vote for the legislature - means that voters can be presented with a broader range of choice under presidential systems than parliamentary ones.
Stability of the office and continuity in terms of public policy. Unlike parliamentary governments, a president and his or her administration normally remains relatively constant throughout their term, which can give greater stability in office and predictability in policy-making than some alternatives. This leads, in theory at least, to more efficient and decisive governance, making it attractive for those cases where governments change frequently because of weak parties or shifting parliamentary coalitions, or where hard political decisions, such as contentious economic reforms, need to be taken.
By contrast, the major disadvantage of presidentialism in post-conflict situations is the propensity of the office to be captured by one faction, party or social group. This can create particular difficulties in multi-ethnic societies, where the president can easily be perceived as the representative of one group only, with limited interest in the needs or votes of others. This is particularly so in cases like Afghanistan, where a number of relatively coherent groups are present.
Other disadvantages include:
No real checks on the executive. This becomes even more true when there is a concordance between the president's party and the majority party in parliament. In this case (typified, for many years, by Mexico) the parliament has almost no real checks on the executive and can become more of a glorified debating chamber than a legitimate house of review. This problem can be exacerbated by the fact that a president, unlike a parliamentary prime minister, can become virtually inviolable during his or her term of office, with no mechanism for dismissing unpopular incumbents.
Lack of flexibility. While impeachment of the president by the legislature is a device built into many presidential systems, it remains the case that the presidency is a much less flexible office than the major alternatives. Salvador Allende's election as president of Chile in 1970, for example, gave him control of the executive with only 36 per cent of the vote, and in opposition to the centre and right-dominated legislature. Some analysts have argued that Chile's 1973 military coup can be traced back to the system that placed an unpopular president in a position of considerable long-term power.
Semi-presidential systems
A final executive type is sometimes called "semi-presidentialism". Under this model, a parliamentary system and a prime minister with some executive powers is combined with a president, who also has executive powers. The ministry is drawn from and subject to the confidence of the legislature. This is a relatively unusual model - found today in France, Portugal, Finland, Sri Lanka and one or two other countries - but nonetheless is sometimes advocated as a desirable executive formulation for fragile democracies.
Advantages:
Can combine advantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The appeal of the semi-presidential model is its ability to combine the benefits of a directly elected president with a prime minister who must command an absolute majority in the legislature. A move to semi-presidentialism has been recommended as a good "half way house" for some countries that want to combine the benefits of both presidential and parliamentary systems.
Mutual consensus requirement. Proponents of semi-presidentialism focus on the capacity of semi-presidentialism to increase the accountability and "identifiability" of the executive, while also building in a system of mutual checks and balances and the need for consensus between the two executive wings of government. This mutual consensus requirement can be particularly important for divided societies, as it requires a president to come to an agreement with the legislature on important issues, and thus to be a force for the "middle ground" rather than the extremes.
Disadvantages:
Propensity for deadlock between and within the executive arms of government. Because a government's powers are effectively divided between the prime minister and the president - for example, foreign affairs powers being the preserve of the president while the prime minister and the cabinet decide domestic policy - a structural tension exists within the government as a whole. This can lead to deadlock and immobilism, particularly if, as occurs relatively often, the prime minister and the president come from opposing political parties. The benefits of compromise and moderation can degenerate into a stand-off. This is especially the case when the division of responsibility between the two offices is not always clear (e.g., foreign policy in the French system), and where the timing and sequencing of elections between the houses differs.
Conclusion
Beyond all of these arguments, there is the empirical record to consider. Of the many states that became independent in the three decades following the end of World War Two, all countries which could claim to have maintained a continuously democratic record to the late 1980s were parliamentary systems. Of the 93 new democracies that gained their independence between 1945 and 1979, all of the 15 countries which remained democratic throughout the 1980s were parliamentary rather than presidential systems, including some of the developing world's most successful democracies like India, Botswana, and Papua New Guinea. Conversely, all the new presidential democracies from this period suffered some form of breakdown. Overall, parliamentary systems have three times the rate of survival of presidential systems.
Dr Benjamin Reilly, Australian National University, Canberra, AUSTRALIA
This short paper sets out options for structuring a system of government and choosing an electoral system in Afghanistan. It focuses on the comparative experience of other transitional democracies in choosing amongst and between the various options available in these areas. In particular, it examines the choices made by other countries which have recently emerged from a period of protracted conflict.
1. Government Structure: Presidential, Parliamentary, or Semi-Presidential?
There are essentially three options for constituting a representative system of government: one based on a parliamentary system, one based on a presidential system, and one based on some mixture of the two (usually called semi-presidentialism).
Parliamentary systems are characterized by the legislature being the principal arena for both lawmaking and (via majority decisions) for executive power. Presidential systems are characterized by the separation of the executive and legislative branches, with executive authority residing outside the legislature, with the president and his or her cabinet. The simplest definition of the differences between the two approaches can thus be summed up by the degree of relative independence of the executive. Presidential systems are characterized by executive independence, whereas parliamentary systems are characterized the mutual dependence and intertwining of both legislative and executive capacities.
In post-conflict societies, the key distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism focuses on the range of parties and opinions that can be represented in the executive under a parliamentary system, in contrast to the unavoidably singular nature of authority represented by the office of the president. However, as with many institutional choices, the debate over the merits of parliamentary versus presidential government is not so much a question of which is best, but rather of the most appropriate choice for a given society, considering its particular social structure, political culture and history.
Parliamentary systems
In general, the majority of the world's "established" democracies use parliamentary systems.
The advantages of parliamentary systems include:
Ability to facilitate the inclusion of all groups within the legislature and the executive. Because cabinets in parliamentary systems are usually drawn from members of the elected legislature, parliamentary government enables the inclusion of all political elements represented in the legislature (including minorities) in the executive. Cabinets comprising a coalition of several
different parties are a typical feature of many well-established parliamentary democracies. In societies deeply divided by ethnic or other cleavages, this principle of inclusion can be vital.
Flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Because governments in most parliamentary systems can change on the floor of the legislature without recourse to a general election, advocates of parliamentarism point to its flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing circumstances as a strong benefit. A discredited government can be dismissed from office by the parliament itself, in contrast to the fixed terms common to presidential systems.
"Checks and balances". By making the executive dependent, at least in theory, upon the confidence of the legislature, parliamentary systems are said to foster greater accountability on the part of the government of the day towards the people's representatives. Proponents argue that this means that there is not only greater public control over the policy-making process, but also greater transparency in the way decisions are made.
The major disadvantages of parliamentary systems include:
Tendency towards ponderous or immobile decision-making. The inclusiveness that typifies coalition governments can easily turn into executive deadlocks caused by the inability of the various parties to agree upon key issues. This was typified by the "immobilism" that affected Fourth Republic France and that was partly responsible for General de Gaulle's assumption of presidential power. Decision-making deadlock was in part responsible for the breakdown of power sharing under Cyprus's 1960 constitution.
Lack of accountability and discipline. Critics also argue that parliamentary systems are inherently less accountable than presidential ones, as responsibility for decisions is taken by the collective cabinet rather than a single figure. This is especially problematic when diverse coalitions form the executive, as it can be difficult for electors to establish who is responsible for a particular decision and make a retrospective judgement as to the performance of the government.
Propensity towards weak or fragmented government. Some parliamentary systems are typified by shifting coalitions of many different political parties, rather than by a strong and disciplined party system. Under such circumstances, executive government is often weak and unstable, leading to a lack of continuity and direction in public policy.
Presidential systems
Presidentialism has been a popular choice amongst many new democracies in the last decade, especially in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. While the influence of the United States, the world's best known presidential system, is probably partly responsible for this trend, recent experience has also highlighted a number of advantages of presidentialism:
A directly elected president is identifiable and accountable to voters to a high degree. The office of the president can be held directly accountable for decisions taken because, in contrast to parliamentary systems, the chief executive is directly chosen by popular vote. It is thus easier for the electorate to reward or retrospectively punish a president (by voting him or her out of office) than is the case with parliamentary systems.
Ability of a president to act as a unifying national figure, standing above the fray of sectarian disputes. A president enjoying broad public support can represent the nation to itself, becoming a unifying symbol between rival political groupings. To play this role, however, it is important that the rules used to elect the president are tailored so as to achieve this type of broad support (see the following section on "Electoral Systems" for details).
Higher degree of choice. The fact that presidential systems typically give voters a dual choice - one vote for the president and one vote for the legislature - means that voters can be presented with a broader range of choice under presidential systems than parliamentary ones.
Stability of the office and continuity in terms of public policy. Unlike parliamentary governments, a president and his or her administration normally remains relatively constant throughout their term, which can give greater stability in office and predictability in policy-making than some alternatives. This leads, in theory at least, to more efficient and decisive governance, making it attractive for those cases where governments change frequently because of weak parties or shifting parliamentary coalitions, or where hard political decisions, such as contentious economic reforms, need to be taken.
By contrast, the major disadvantage of presidentialism in post-conflict situations is the propensity of the office to be captured by one faction, party or social group. This can create particular difficulties in multi-ethnic societies, where the president can easily be perceived as the representative of one group only, with limited interest in the needs or votes of others. This is particularly so in cases like Afghanistan, where a number of relatively coherent groups are present.
Other disadvantages include:
No real checks on the executive. This becomes even more true when there is a concordance between the president's party and the majority party in parliament. In this case (typified, for many years, by Mexico) the parliament has almost no real checks on the executive and can become more of a glorified debating chamber than a legitimate house of review. This problem can be exacerbated by the fact that a president, unlike a parliamentary prime minister, can become virtually inviolable during his or her term of office, with no mechanism for dismissing unpopular incumbents.
Lack of flexibility. While impeachment of the president by the legislature is a device built into many presidential systems, it remains the case that the presidency is a much less flexible office than the major alternatives. Salvador Allende's election as president of Chile in 1970, for example, gave him control of the executive with only 36 per cent of the vote, and in opposition to the centre and right-dominated legislature. Some analysts have argued that Chile's 1973 military coup can be traced back to the system that placed an unpopular president in a position of considerable long-term power.
Semi-presidential systems
A final executive type is sometimes called "semi-presidentialism". Under this model, a parliamentary system and a prime minister with some executive powers is combined with a president, who also has executive powers. The ministry is drawn from and subject to the confidence of the legislature. This is a relatively unusual model - found today in France, Portugal, Finland, Sri Lanka and one or two other countries - but nonetheless is sometimes advocated as a desirable executive formulation for fragile democracies.
Advantages:
Can combine advantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The appeal of the semi-presidential model is its ability to combine the benefits of a directly elected president with a prime minister who must command an absolute majority in the legislature. A move to semi-presidentialism has been recommended as a good "half way house" for some countries that want to combine the benefits of both presidential and parliamentary systems.
Mutual consensus requirement. Proponents of semi-presidentialism focus on the capacity of semi-presidentialism to increase the accountability and "identifiability" of the executive, while also building in a system of mutual checks and balances and the need for consensus between the two executive wings of government. This mutual consensus requirement can be particularly important for divided societies, as it requires a president to come to an agreement with the legislature on important issues, and thus to be a force for the "middle ground" rather than the extremes.
Disadvantages:
Propensity for deadlock between and within the executive arms of government. Because a government's powers are effectively divided between the prime minister and the president - for example, foreign affairs powers being the preserve of the president while the prime minister and the cabinet decide domestic policy - a structural tension exists within the government as a whole. This can lead to deadlock and immobilism, particularly if, as occurs relatively often, the prime minister and the president come from opposing political parties. The benefits of compromise and moderation can degenerate into a stand-off. This is especially the case when the division of responsibility between the two offices is not always clear (e.g., foreign policy in the French system), and where the timing and sequencing of elections between the houses differs.
Conclusion
Beyond all of these arguments, there is the empirical record to consider. Of the many states that became independent in the three decades following the end of World War Two, all countries which could claim to have maintained a continuously democratic record to the late 1980s were parliamentary systems. Of the 93 new democracies that gained their independence between 1945 and 1979, all of the 15 countries which remained democratic throughout the 1980s were parliamentary rather than presidential systems, including some of the developing world's most successful democracies like India, Botswana, and Papua New Guinea. Conversely, all the new presidential democracies from this period suffered some form of breakdown. Overall, parliamentary systems have three times the rate of survival of presidential systems.
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